

SAUDI ARABIA

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (IIPA) 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Special 301 Recommendation: Saudi Arabia should be placed on the Watch List in 2009 with an out-of-cycle review (OCR) to monitor progress toward meeting key near term enforcement benchmarks.

Executive Summary: Saudi Arabia continues to have the highest piracy levels of any other country in the Gulf region. For years, sporadic raiding activity would occur but information as to what happened thereafter remained unknown to rights holders due to the government's non-transparent practices. Fines were woefully low; deterrence was non-existent. Efforts to engage the Saudi government met with a number of commitments, followed by a frustrating lack of any action to reform the system. The legitimate market came close to disappearing in 2007.

However, some welcome signs began to appear in early 2008. The Minister of Culture and Information took a personal interest in these issues and named his Deputy Minister to oversee the implementation of a transparent reporting system by placing all raid cases on a public website and permitting rights holders to participate fully as cases were adjudicated in the Ministry's Violations Review Committee. This has yet to be fully implemented and greater progress must be made. The Deputy Minister has recently ordered a program of constant raiding of the local markets against street vendors, which, has had a significant impact. Additionally, over the last year the authorities have orchestrated many actions against source piracy seizing hundreds of thousands of CDs. Finally, the adjudication process is starting to become more transparent; rights holders and their legal counsel can now track cases through litigation. These hopeful signs must now be followed through to conclusion. If the leadership that has been shown to date continues and is followed by concrete actions, there is a chance that the Saudi market can become what it should be, the best in the Gulf.

Priority actions to be taken in 2009: IIPA requests the following actions by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which, if taken, would result in the most significant commercial benefits to the copyright industries:

Transparency

- The Ministry of Culture and Information (MOCI) must complete the task, by the end of the OCR period, of uploading all 2008 and 2009 raids, hearing and Violations Review Committee (VRC) judgment/penalty data on the MOCI website in both Arabic and English. (OCR benchmark)
- Rights holders must be allowed to participate fully in the MOCI enforcement process, including the right to prepare written submissions and appear at all hearings before the Committee. Rights holders should be allowed to present written and oral evidence and argument with respect to issues relating to administrative liability, the level of penalties to be imposed, and on the level of damages/compensation to be awarded the rights holder, as required by the TRIPS Agreement. (OCR benchmark)
- As now provided by MOCI procedures, rights holders shall have the right to appeal, at their discretion, inadequate, non-deterrent sentences or compensation awards to the Board of Grievances. (OCR benchmark)

Deterrent Enforcement

- MOCI, through its inspectors and in partnership with the police, must continue high levels of raiding activity throughout the Kingdom. HE A.R.A. Al-Hazaa, has spearheaded a major effort to root out street vendors in Riyadh. His clear and forthright zero-tolerance policy should be continued throughout the Kingdom until street vendor piracy becomes a *de minimis* problem. (OCR benchmark)
- Administrative penalties imposed by the VRC should be increased to provide more deterrence, under the guidance of Minister and Deputy Minister Al-Hazaa.
- Police Committee in Riyadh should be duplicated in other major cities to assist with street vendor raids and to investigate large producers and distributors of pirate product. Greater police involvement must be ensured.
- The Saudi government should cooperate with rights holders in bringing a test case involving a major seizure before the Board of Grievances (BoG) to secure a deterrent sentence of imprisonment by the end of the OCR period, as a



demonstration of deterrent BoG criminal sentences generally. The Minister and the BoG should work together to ensure that high fines, and especially imprisonment, become the norm in the Kingdom for serious acts of piracy. (OCR benchmark)

- A special cyber crime unit within the Police Committees and an Internet piracy unit at MOCI should be established,¹ and the MOCI should work closely with the Communication and Information Technology Commission (CITC) to take actions against Internet piracy.
- The CITC must begin closing down websites, not just for pornographic content, but for copyright violations and, if it is a local website, subject the owner to deterrent penalties.
- The MOCI, the police and rights holders should cooperate to develop a plan to convert the compounds to legitimacy, bringing Pay-TV piracy in the compounds to an end.
- The customs system must be reformed to establish an IPR Task Force and customs officers must be provided with *ex officio* authority to suspend the import of pirate product into the Kingdom. This is especially relevant against pirate optical discs and decoder boxes that circumvent encryption technologies.
- The government's determination to reduce piracy levels, including these actions, should be widely publicized throughout the Kingdom.

Ensure Legal Use of Copyrighted Materials

- Led by the King and MOCI, the KSA government should make significant progress toward legalizing software use in government ministries and should enter into agreements with software companies to purchase legal software (OCR benchmark)
- Authorities should collaborate with relevant supervisory sections of the Ministry of Education/Higher Education to ensure that all state and private universities demonstrate that their educational materials used on campus have been purchased from legitimate suppliers.

Copyright Law Reform

- Amend the Copyright Act to fully implement and ratify, the WIPO Internet Treaties.

For more details on Saudi Arabia's Special 301 history, see IIPA's "History" Appendix to this filing.² Please see also previous years' reports.³

¹ Such unit could be based on the model in place in Lebanon.

² <http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2009SPECIAL301HISTORICALSUMMARY.pdf>.

³ <http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html>.

SAUDI ARABIA
Estimated Trade Losses Due to Copyright Piracy
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
and Levels of Piracy: 2004-2008⁴

INDUSTRY	2008		2007		2006		2005		2004	
	Loss	Level								
Records & Music	NA	NA	25.0	60%	20.0	50%	20.0	50%	15.0	35%
Business Software ⁵	126.0	54%	97.0	51%	115.0	52%	105.0	52%	73.0	52%
Motion Pictures ⁶	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	95.0	95%	20.0	40%
Entertainment Software	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	95%	NA	68%
Books	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.0	NA	10.0	NA	14.0	NA
TOTALS	126.0		122.0		143.0		135.0		122.0	

UPDATE ON PIRACY IN SAUDI ARABIA

Optical disc and other hard goods piracy generally: For at least each of the last five years, piracy levels have increased, including in 2008. Saudi Arabia now holds the dubious honor of having the highest piracy levels in the GCC -- over 90% for videos, videogames and recordings. At the retail level, this is also true for business software which is openly available for hard disk loading in computer shops or from street vendors. Estimates of unauthorized use of software in government ministries and in private business are over 50% of the market. Local licensees -- all Saudi companies -- report diminishing revenues, significant closure of retail outlets and warehouses for legitimate product, and that they cannot maintain themselves in business unless something is done about piracy immediately. Pirated copies of videos, musical recordings, and videogames are brazenly sold in retail stores and by street hawkers in the larger markets in all major cities. Legal product is limited only to the expensive stores usually in malls, frequented by well-to-do Saudis and even here the number of copies sold are minimal for the market. The vast majority of pirated video and music product is locally "burned" OD product sold with obviously photocopied inlays and covers, with some imported product from South and Southeast Asia. However, for videogames the ratio is about 50-50.

Motion pictures: For the motion picture industry, a comparison of sales figures for various markets in the GCC demonstrates vividly the problem in the KSA. The launch of a Hollywood blockbuster might result in sales of 3000-5000 legitimate copies in Saudi. By contrast the same video will sell for the same amount in Qatar. Qatar has a population of 1 million, the KSA 28.2 million. Another blockbuster sold 5000 copies in Saudi Arabia and 25,000 copies in nearby UAE which has a population of 4.4 million. In meetings with local video licensees, IIPA was told that a single pirate retailer alone sold 25,000 copies of the pirated video of a major Hollywood action blockbuster, with little fear of raids and no fear of substantial penalties, beyond loss of inventory. Pirate DVDs can contain up to 30 theatrical films and sell for a mere US\$6.50. Were it not for one high-end store with 15 outlets, these licensees would have almost no legitimate sales. This one chain accounts for 70% of the legitimate sales of video product. Customers are wealthier people who would rather buy the original for US\$24, than a cheap looking and possibly camcorder pirate copy for US\$3 or even less. Because video stores have a higher chance of getting raided than stores dealing in videogames, the former exhibit their wares in catalogues from which you order and then a courier runs out the back and returns with your copy.

⁴ The methodology used by IIPA member associations to calculate these estimated piracy levels and losses is described in IIPA's 2009 Special 301 submission at www.iipa.com/pdf/2009spec301methodology.pdf. For information on the history of Saudi Arabia under Special 301 review, see Appendix D at (<http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2009SPEC301USTRHISTORY.pdf>) and Appendix E at (<http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2009SPEC301HISTORICALSUMMARY.pdf>) of this submission.

⁵ BSA's 2008 statistics are preliminary. They represent the U.S. software publishers' share of software piracy losses in Saudi Arabia, and follow the methodology compiled in the Fifth Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study (May 2008), available at <http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/>. These figures cover, in addition to business applications software, computer applications such as operating systems, consumer applications such as PC gaming, personal finance, and reference software.

⁶ MPAA's trade loss estimates and piracy levels for 2006 through 2008 are not available. MPAA did provide 2005 estimates for a select group of countries, using a new methodology that analyzed both physical/"hard goods" and Internet piracy. Details regarding MPAA's methodology for 2005 and prior years are found in Appendix B of this IIPA submission.

Entertainment software: The situation is even worse for entertainment software; pirated copies are sold openly everywhere. Businesses engaged in the sale of legitimate video game product are severely undermined by the ready availability of pirated game product in the market. Licensees report that there is a marked contrast between sales of entertainment software for platforms that have been hacked and those platforms that, to date, remain impervious to hacking attempts. For example, sales of legitimate games for the Sony PS3 platform, which remains un-hacked, are actually higher than the sales of legitimate games for the Sony PS2 platform, for which circumvention devices have long been widely available (even though the price for the legitimate PS3 game is naturally higher than that of the legitimate PS2 game). Unless the situation greatly improves, vendors of legitimate video game product face an uphill battle to remain in business. Such a situation inevitably takes a toll on employment in the retail business as well as the ability of rights holders to establish a foothold in the legitimate market.

Music and recordings: It is much the same for the music industry. International repertoire makes up 20% of the market, Arabic language product 70% and Indian 10%. One of the licensees reported that it went from 13 retail shops and 3 warehouses a few years ago to 2 remaining retail stores and only one warehouse in 2008. The licensees estimate the piracy rate for sound recordings at over 90%.

Books and journals: In 2008, the publishing industry experienced increased levels of piracy in Saudi Arabia. Print piracy presents the single biggest problem to publishers. Reportedly, some of pirated books sold in the Kingdom are imported from neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and the UAE, but printing locally for the Saudi Arabian market continues as well. Thus, pirated copies of books, especially higher education textbooks and English language teaching (ELT) materials, continue to be available on and around university campuses. Illegal photocopying continues to plague this market as well. Furthermore, some publishers note that universities are prone to view book piracy lightly, with one public university threatening a publishing distributor with wholesale photocopying of its products if the legitimate versions were not supplied quickly enough. This betrays an attitude about book piracy from public officials that is simply unacceptable. By contrast, other universities presented a good record again in 2008, regulating purchase practices to ensure compliance with the law (i.e., they "buy centrally," which means that all the adoptions within a university are collated by its purchasing department, which runs an on-campus bookshop). IIPA and AAP hope to see the remaining institutions legalizing their acquisition processes by buying centrally as well. Failing to do so invites an overrunning of the market by pirate copies, supplanting legal purchases. The industry also faces increased online piracy, with websites regularly offering unauthorized downloads of their products. Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest potential markets for the book and journal publishers in the Gulf region, and should be protected. However, based on industry experiences the few investigations and enforcement actions conducted against suspected cases of book piracy have been protracted and convoluted.

Business software: While the piracy rates for business software continue to be roughly constant, dollar losses to the software industry have gone up each of the last three years, due to strong IT growth and government and company use of unlicensed software. Losses increased to \$126 million in 2008 with a piracy level of 54% of the total market, with the retail market segment much higher.

Organized crime: Piracy in the Kingdom can also be linked to organized criminal elements in Saudi Arabia. For example, IIPA reported last year that, in mid-December 2007, the authorities conducted a raid against four warehouses in Riyadh. In addition to the seizure of close to 500,000 units of pirated music and video cassettes, VCDs and DVDs, the police found a large cache of explosives and weapons. Fifteen individuals were arrested.⁷

Theft of Pay-TV signals in the compounds: Signal piracy of premium services like Showtime, Orbit, and ART in compounds continues to be a very serious problem in Saudi Arabia. The compounds may have upwards of hundreds/thousands of homes under a single management which centrally controls and operates the cable service within each compound. The compounds utilize a smart card, installing it in their centralized head end and then redistributing Pay TV channels to hundreds/thousands of homes. The management of these compounds are very influential and can clearly

⁷ IIPA also has reported that early in 2005, for example, HE Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, ordered a series of raids in the Al Batha area against hard core criminal activities, which unearthed many criminal operations that were involved with prostitution and narcotics. The police also encountered and seized millions of pirate DVDs, showing that piracy is providing easy funds to sustain other hard core criminal operations.

afford to pay for premium channels. But it is very difficult for even the police to enter these compounds quickly and easily; they are heavily guarded by private security firms and by the time the raid team finally gets to the head end, following delays navigating the multiple security checks, the evidence of piracy has conveniently disappeared. Another major issue effecting the Pay TV stakeholders is the illegal redistribution of decoder boxes that circumvent encryption technologies.

Internet piracy: Internet use and broadband penetration rate in the Kingdom is growing and piracy is growing with it. Most pirate sites originate from outside Saudi Arabia. Because the Internet is completely filtered by the government through the CITC, any site can be blocked by making a request to the agency. While CITC will block sites containing pirate material, it is never clear whether it is done for this reason or because the site or service provides or links to content otherwise deemed objectionable. Many popular BitTorrent services and warez sites were blocked in 2008. In one action in September 2008, sites containing 104,000 movie titles, 50,000 game titles, 106,000 music & album titles and 2,850 TV shows, were blocked by the CITC. While foreign and local sites have been routinely blocked upon request (as in the case just mentioned) from the Arabian Antipiracy Alliance (AAA) which represents various U.S. rights holders in antipiracy actions in the KSA, the CITC has little training in IP matters and eventually it will be necessary to involve the MOCI in advising CITC on infringement issues. Because the Internet is growing by over 35% per year in the Kingdom, an Internet piracy unit should be created at MOCI to work with CITC to ensure that sites or services dealing in infringing material will not be available to consumers in the Kingdom, but that legal services will be available.

Enforcement in Saudi Arabia is totally inadequate; but recent actions show hope for change: Until 2008, there was no reform taken in an already inadequate and non-deterrent enforcement system. As a result, piracy levels got higher and losses to rights holders increased significantly. The MOCI, which is principally responsible for copyright enforcement⁸, ran raids generally upon request, but after the raid was conducted, the system became completely non-transparent. Rights holders were not able to learn anything about what happened after raids were run until the end of the year when the Ministry published statistics of how many raids it ran, and the total amount of the fines that were assessed. We now know that very few administrative prosecutions were actually commenced and brought before the Violations Review Committee for adjudication. In 2007, the backlog of cases were discovered to be in the hundreds and very few, and always very low, fines were imposed.

To show how ineffective this system was, the Arabian Anti-Piracy Alliance (AAA), decided to conduct a "fear factor" survey in 2005-2006, to show how the pirate community and the public reacted to raids and MOCI actions. The survey found that 89% felt that the owner of a pirate establishment would never be imprisoned; 70% felt that the retail establishment would never be closed; and 85% felt that a pirate many of whom are foreign workers would never be deported. Few believed that the level of fines offered any deterrence to the pirate trade whatsoever. The study resulted in an increased awareness among rights holders and the public of the problem of piracy.

Piracy levels are high and increasing because (a) there is no transparency in the system; the public has no idea what the government is doing, and the pirates believe the enforcement system and the fines are the proverbial "cost of doing business;" (b) there were few cases adjudicated and fines were always low and non-deterrent; (c) there was no criminal punishment nor the threat of imprisonment; (d) MOCI was understaffed and for the most part untrained; and (e) the police, that had the resources to deal with sources of piracy, were rarely involved.

Up until the first quarter of 2008, there was virtually no progress made in securing reforms at MOCI or in the enforcement system generally. In 2006, after a USG mission and a visit to the Kingdom by an IIPA delegation, King Abdullah issued a "circular" that directed that transparency and deterrent penalties should be established in the Kingdom and that government ministries should legalize their software use. Despite this clear message from the King and promises to the USG and an IIPA delegation that had travelled to Riyadh, 2007 saw no progress whatsoever in implementing any of these reforms. By the end of 2007, transparency in the administrative enforcement process at the MOCI had not been established and the VRC had failed to issue deterrent fines.

⁸ MOCI is generally responsible for licensing retail outlets. Only the police have jurisdiction to raid distributors and production facilities or arrest street vendors. While MOCI is a key component of the KSA enforcement system, the police are also essential to lowering levels of piracy.

In its 2008 Special 301 submission, IIPA outlined the history of the USG and IIPA discussions with the Ministry and the KSA government's IPR Committee on the issues of transparency, including why the WTO TRIPS Agreement required it. IIPA highlighted the need for deterrent penalties and provided a detailed description of how that penalty structure should be used. We cited to a raid involving seizure of over 2 million units of pirate product which was never even brought before the VRC.⁹ We noted that no case had ever been taken before the Board of Grievances (BoG) which has the power to review and increase fines, impose fines over the VRC maximum (100,000 Riyals or US\$26,661), and can impose a sentence of imprisonment.¹⁰ We noted that in September 2006, the Saudi government promised to provide transparency by establishing an "electronic gateway" or web portal on which they would post all raids, hearings and VRC judgments and penalties.¹¹

As of the filing of IIPA's 2008 submission, the website existed but had no data on it. As far as we knew, the VRC had not imposed deterrent fines (the average fine was 10,000 riyals (US\$2,666) and the highest fine ever imposed was 50,000 riyals (US\$13,330). No case had been referred to the BoG as the Copyright Act provided and there had never been a jail term imposed on a pirate regardless of how serious the offense. We also highlighted that the King had mandated that the KSA government use only legal software but that, in fact, the software piracy rate in the government was an estimated 75%. We continued to commend the Saudi government and the MOCI for its raiding activity but set out our frustration at the almost complete lack of progress on any other front, despite promises made over one year previously.

In March 2008, another IIPA delegation went to Riyadh and met personally with MOCI Minister Madani, joined by representatives from the U.S. Embassy. After much debate and discussion, the Minister concluded that the MOCI and VRC enforcement process should be made fully transparent and that would include placing all cases and judgment on the Ministry's website which would be fully available to the public in Arabic and English. He appointed his Deputy Minister HE A.R.A. Al-Hazzaa to oversee this process. Press releases were issued thanking the Minister and rights holders were hopeful that, with this support from the Minister, it was just a matter of time before these commitments would be met.

IIPA has since met on at least two occasions with HE Al-Hazzaa as have the local representatives of U.S. rights holders. The following actions have been taken in 2008 due to the leadership and perseverance of the Deputy Minister:

- There have been raids against source piracy resulting in hundreds of thousands of CDs seized.
- The VRC has eliminated its backlog and provided rights holders with the judgment and the amount of the fine in close to 100 of these backlogged cases.
- Some cases have been placed on the website but only those originating in Riyadh and still only available in Arabic. The Ministry was offered assistance by the private sector, but that invitation has not been taken up.
- Deputy Minister Al-Hazzaa took the initiative to join two Ministry raiding teams in order to understand the full impact of the high levels of piracy in the marketplace.
- He has sent four letters to compounds in Riyadh asking them to cease their infringement. We expect further actions to be taken.
- He has ordered the Ministry to commence constant raiding at the Olaya market and in other markets. Tens of thousands of copies of pirate product have been seized and these raids are continuing as of the second week in February 2009. IIPA and local rights holders asked that there be a zero-tolerance policy against street vendors of pirate product. The Ministry is moving aggressively on that request.
- Working with the Deputy Minister, rights holders have commenced the process of taking a major piracy case through the process for eventual decision by the BoG and will ask that imprisonment be imposed.

IIPA commends both the Minister and the Deputy Minister for taking these actions. They have not yet resulted in a lowering of the piracy rate in the Kingdom, and given the 90% piracy levels there, IIPA continues to recommend that Saudi Arabia be maintained on the Watch List. However, we also recommend that an out-of-cycle review be conducted in

⁹ The raid in this case was run in May 2005 in Dammam

¹⁰ Members of the Board of Grievances with whom IIPA met in January 2006 (and in meetings in Washington DC since that time) assured the IIPA delegation that if a case were brought to them, either directly by the VRC or as the result of an appeal by a rights holder, they would impose deterrent penalties.

¹¹ This detailed discussion can be found on pp. 118-120 at <http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2008/2008SPEC301SAUDIARABIA.pdf>

the fall of 2009. The industries believe, given the above progress, that it is realistic to expect that the government can, given what has been done to date by the Ministry, take the following actions by the end of the OCR period:

- Fully populate the website with data on raids, hearing dates, judgments and penalties commencing at the beginning of 2008 through the present, in both Arabic and English;
- Allow rights holders' legal representatives to appear before the VRC at all hearings and to present evidence and argument, particularly on the appropriate level of penalties;
- Continue a zero-tolerance policy toward street vendor piracy in the major cities until it becomes a *de minimis* problem;
- Shepherd, in cooperation with rights holders, a case involving a major seizure through the Board of Grievances and impose a sentence of imprisonment, thereby signaling to citizens that from then on piracy crimes will receive deterrent penalties and especially imprisonment in appropriate cases;
- Make significant progress toward legalizing software use in the KSA government;
- Publicize widely all these actions, including press statements by high government officials that piracy will no longer be tolerated.

COPYRIGHT AND RELATED LAWS

Amendments to adopt all obligations in the WIPO Internet Treaties' requirements: While virtually all the deficiencies in the Saudi Copyright Law have been remedied in the new implementing regulations adopted in 2005,¹² IIPA has continually impressed upon Kingdom officials the importance of developing the legal infrastructure for electronic commerce by fully implementing, and then ratifying, the WCT and WPPT. The initial reception to this suggestion was positive, and industry and the U.S. government should work closely with the responsible agencies (including MOCI) to assist with advice and training. During the 2006 meetings in Washington, DC, the Saudi government representatives indicated that they had commenced a review of the WIPO Internet Treaties issues and that the next step was to seek WIPO's advice on how best to proceed with implementing legislation. Since then we have not heard of any further progress. This process should begin immediately by seeking the advice of WIPO.

MARKET ACCESS

Ban on cinemas: All public exhibition of films is prohibited by law in Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that in October 2005, the government allowed a trial of one cinema to screen cartoons to women and children only, there appears to be no further removal of prohibition of a theatrical market in Saudi Arabia. This total ban is not only unfair and market-closing, it also opens the door wide to pirate operators who do not follow the law and bring in movies that the Saudi government has never had an opportunity to review for content or had any say in their distribution.

Video outlet license requirements: Video outlets must be licensed by MOCI. That Ministry has, however, demonstrated great reluctance in allowing general retail stores, such as supermarkets and toy stores, to obtain licenses. Such licensing requirements limit the ability of video distributors to reach important market segments.

Restrictions on home video distribution: Foreign companies are prohibited from importing or distributing home video product in Saudi Arabia. Only Saudi nationals or Saudi-owned companies have this right. Such restrictions should be removed to encourage growth of the video market.

¹² Two deficiencies appear to remain, however. The law appears not to mandate destruction of infringing goods and does not require the award of costs and attorney's fees as required by TRIPS. Furthermore, statutory prison sentences remain very low. In the 2006 IIPA meeting, the MOCI Acting Minister indicated a willingness to propose raising these terms in the near future. Nothing further has been done since that time.